Theorizing research ethics for the study of psychological phenomena from within relational everyday life by Hilppö, Jaakko et al.
ARENA OF ETHICS
Theorizing Research Ethics for the Study
of Psychological Phenomena from Within Relational
Everyday Life
Jaakko Hilppö1 & Niklas Alexander Chimirri2 & Antti Rajala1
Received: 18 February 2019 /Revised: 31 May 2019 /Accepted: 5 June 2019
# The Author(s) 2019
Abstract
How to investigate psychologically relevant phenomena in the most ethical ways possible
is an enduring question for researchers not only in psychology but also in adjacent fields
that study human subjectivity. Once acknowledging that both researchers and the people
whose lives they want to study are human beings acting in a common world, also
inhabited by non-human beings, the relationship between researchers and participants
touches upon fundamental questions not only about what it means to do research together,
but also what it means to conduct life in this world together. This implies that questions
regarding what counts as ethical conduct need to be accentuated and also profoundly re-
drawn given the encompassing complexity of these relations. In this article, we will
shortly review the theoretical foundations and associated problematics of the dominant
view of the researcher-researched relationship in current psychological (and other)
research ethics. We then present and discuss what we mean by a relational ethical position
from within practice and for practice. We will also shortly introduce how the other
contributions to this special section advance the theoretical debates on research ethics.
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“For in fact, we owe the very possibility of our having a life of our own to their [the
others] responsiveness toward us” (Shotter 2005, p. 129).
“There is no alibi in being” (Bakhtin 1993).
This special section brings together a collection of articles that all focus on an enduring
question for the field of psychology: how to investigate psychologically relevant phenomena
in the most ethical ways possible? Since its inaugural issue in 1953, the American Psychology
Association’s Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct has reached its 9th
revision in 2002 with amendments made as recently as 2017, and the British Psychological
Society released a revised version of their Code of Ethics and Conduct in 2018. The Library of
Congress lists more than 1200 books under the subject of “ethic” and “psychology” with the
oldest ones dating to the latter half of the nineteenth century.1 More recently, a number of
books, special issues and impactful articles regarding research ethics have been published
regularly in various psychological journals or in neighboring fields (e.g., Baumrind 1964;
Keehn 1982; Brinkmann and Kvale 2005; Etzel and Watson II 2006; Harlow and Oswald
2016; Campbell and Morris 2017). What the volume of these works speak for is that the
boundaries of ethically sound research need to be continually reflected on, explored and
redefined, mounding in a historically situated negotiation process that pertains to
psychology just as much as to any other field of research that investigates human subjects,
be it their psyche, their actions, their cultures, their knowledges, and so on. Psychological
ethical problems are common to any research practice that seeks to theorize on behalf of other
human beings, and arguably, on behalf of anything that constitutes human beings.
This special section puts its main focus on how the relationship between the researcher and
the people whose lives are studied is conceptualized and theorized. A central premise that
frames these explorations is the claim that human ways of being and becoming in the world are
fundamentally relational. Well captured by Shotter (2005) in the quote above, this relationality
does not only refer to the way in which independent individuals are connected and interact
together (a weak relationalist perspective according to O’Doherty and Burgess 2019). More
significantly, the premise of relationality captures the seemingly paradoxical condition of our
being, the fact that we are each given birth and sustained by the way in which others respond to
us (a strong relationalist perspective according to O’Doherty and Burgess 2019). That is, we
become ourselves and are ourselves through others. This proposition underlines the fact that
our way of being-in-the-world is relational from its very inception, and that each of us emerges
on the basis of this fundamental condition of responsiveness.
For us, this intersubjectively plausible premise holds deep ethical implications that cannot
be neglected, either in the practice of psychological research or elsewhere in everyday life. As
Bakhtin above notes, when we owe our existence in the world, to the world, and the others in
it, this comes with moral responsibility. There is no neutral position, no place from where we
can look at the world as if detached from its events, as if not responsible for what is going on.
We are then and there, present as persons and hence morally implicated through our relation to
the world and others in it. Not only does such relationality highlight how our research work is
made possible in the first place, by how the people whose lives we want to understand respond
to us, but most importantly how the way we respond and interact with these people, and they
with us, implicates us in each other’s lives. From a relational stance, being human entails an
1 e.g., Bain, A. (1868). Mental and Moral Science: A Compendium of Psychology and Ethics. London:
Longmans, Green, and Co.
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ethical commitment to other people, a moral debt to do good to one another given our
inextricably relational origins (see also Taylor 1991).
The Conceptual Status Quo of the Researcher-Researched Relationship
The relationship between the researcher and the researched, as it is theorized in current
psychological and many other research ethics, in contrast to more relational perspectives, is
to follow a set of principles safeguarding the individual test person’s fundamental rights when
acting as research object. These principles were developed in the middle of the twentieth
century in response to severe mistreatment of human research subjects in medical experiments.
While these sets of principles, like the Nuremberg Code of Ethics or the Helsinki Declaration,
marked a leap forward in ensuring research participants’ human rights, they have also met with
strong criticism from both the humanistic and the social sciences (e.g., Dingwall 2012;
Emmerich 2016). This can both be related to the increasing proliferation and acceptance of
qualitative research across fields of research (e.g., Roth 2005; see also Miller et al. 2012;
Unger et al. 2016), but also to new digital possibilities to scrutinize (massive) amounts of
(partly sensitive) data without the knowledge of the researched person(s) in question (e.g.,
Markham et al. 2018).
These debates are highly relevant to psychology and adjacent fields of research that study
human subjectivity. The natural-scientific paradigm ingrained in, for example, the Nuremberg
Code, is ill-equipped for the study of complex psychological phenomena, and of how they play
out in everyday life. Most fundamentally, the paradigm renders it impossible to address the
problematic positioning of research participants as objects that can be experimented on and
controlled, as it ignores the mutually constitutive relationship of researcher and researched
(Strong 2005). For instance, psychological theoreticians such as Holzkamp (2013) crucially
remind us that even in experimental setups, psychologists are dependent on the participants’
willingness to actively read and act on the situational circumstances, in that they are implicitly
asked to act as if they were “test subjects,” or more precisely objects of the experimenter’s
inquiry. For inquiry concerned with subjectivity, Holzkamp therefore argues that even lab
research would essentially need to be explored and understood from within a conceptual
framework that takes its point of departure from everyday human practice. Such analyses
would start from within the relationship between the researcher and the researched (see also
Shotter 2005, 2013). Similarly, Martin et al. (2003) note that psychology based on the natural-
scientific paradigm has paid too little theoretical attention to how the research participants
themselves interact with the research, not just by complying with the researcher’s requests, but
crucially with how they later react to the research and its results, for example by interpreting
their own lives though the research results. In short, conceptualizing and treating research
participants as natural kinds (akin to inanimate physical entities) rather than psychological
kinds (beings shaped by the practices and classifications of their practices, cultures and
societies) neglects or even willingly undermines the agency of the participants.
Another side of the debate has focused on the proclaimed universality of ethical guidelines.
According to the critics, irrespective of whether professional communities can reach an
agreement on the rules of proper ethical conduct or not (e.g., establish an ethical code for
psychological research), the rules themselves do not tell when or how we should abide by them
(Jonsen and Toulmin 1988; cited in Brinkmann and Kvale 2005; cf. also Allen and Israel
2018). With regard to informed consent, for instance, although several ethical guidelines
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emphasize the transparent provision of adequate and sufficient information about the possible
consequences of participation, the concrete assessment of whether these criteria are met are
largely left up to the deliberation of the respective researcher(s) (see also O’Doherty and
Burgess 2019; Lee 1999 on a similar fundamental ambivalence in the UN Convention on the
Rights of the Child). As such, guidelines that are taken to be of universal validity, and are in
consequence to be applied to any case irrespective of context, can, from a relational perspec-
tive, introduce rules and regulations into the researcher-researched relationship that are not
necessary for ensuring mutual ethical conduct. As a result, such guidelines weaken their own
impact and create an artificial, conceptually detrimental distance between the researcher and
the researched (e.g., Wilson and Hodgson 2012).
Postcolonial scholars in particular have criticized the fact that universalist ethical guidelines
further mystify their socioculturally contextual specificity, and implicitly reproduce ethnocentric
Western ideals about what is ethical in life, by grounding its determination in an abstract process
of rational deliberation not open to other forms of being, i.e., of conducting everyday life (e.g.,
Andreotti 2011; Toulmin and Toulmin 1992). In practice, the application of universal rule-based
ethics, including the establishment of institutional review boards (IRB) as obligatory passage
points before any research work can be carried out, have also raised concerns about how the
ethical deliberation regarding different research projects has slipped away from the professional
communities doing the actual research work (Dingwall 2012). Similarly, the highly bureaucratic
process of gaining IRB approval runs the risk of alienating early career researchers from ethical
deliberation (e.g., Sleeboom-Faulkner et al. 2017), a task they will unavoidably face once they
come to implement their research work together with other human beings in practice. When
gaining approval becomes a hindrance or an obstacle for conducting the research, instead of an
opportunity to reflect on possible ethical dilemmas with senior and other fellow colleagues, the
moral ground for applying the required ethical guidelines is weakened in actuality.
If we take these critiques and debates to heart, what avenues open up for psychological
research? If psychology, as we think, is fundamentally about the study of human ways of being
and becoming, as suggested by Valsiner et al. (2016), what then are the ethical ways in which
these phenomena can be approached and investigated? For us, one necessary way forward
would be to acknowledge that psychological phenomena need to be scrutinized from within
everyday human practice, from within the immanent relationality of the researcher and the
researched, in terms of a relational ethics. To illustrate what we mean by this, we will in the
remaining pages suggest some central conceptual features of a relational ethics that is to
foundationally reconfigure the researcher-researched relationship as inextricably intertwined in
one another’s everyday lived life.
Relational Ethics
A central tenet in relational ethics is the fundamental reframing of the context for ethical
decision-making, especially with regard to situating the relationship between the researcher
and the researched (e.g., Piper and Simons 2011). Whereas conventional rule-based, proce-
dural ethics highlights the ethical decision-making of independent individuals based on their
own rational deliberation, relational ethics underscores the fundamental connection between
people (Austin 2007; Pollard 2015). In relational ethics, primacy is placed on the relationship
between persons and on their constitutive interdependency as the ground for ethical decision-
making. Hence, the particularity of who the people involved are, of their respective
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attentiveness to each other and their lives, shall be able to come to the fore. In this context,
ethical guidelines are more rules of thumb than absolute rules, and used as part of many other
contextual resources available to the persons in the decision-making situation (Brinkmann and
Kvale 2008). Pollard (2015, 366) suggests for example that “we may choose to use our
knowledge of the ethical principle of justice and our experiences with compassion to help
guide ethical action.” Relationality does not, however, only refer to the constitutive relation
between human beings. In various traditions of thought, the mutual constitutiveness of human
beings and the world more generally is theorized. This implies that we are always and already
implicated in an ethical relationship with the world. Each action we take has a moral side to it,
most often without us noticing, and brings about many of consequences, some unexpected.
Therefore, engagement in an ethical relationship is not considered a decision but a conse-
quence of how we are and seek to be in the world.
A second central tenet in relational ethics concerns the openness of the dialog between the
researcher and the researched and of how that relationship evolves. In relational ethics, the
ethicality of actions is not determined by the extent to which they follow any given ethical
norms, or by how ethical dilemmas are solved on their grounds. Rather, being ethical means
being attentive and responsive to the other people in the relationship (Austin 2007). To realize
this, researchers are not only called to question their assumptions and possible predispositions
regarding the persons whose lives they want to investigate, but also to be open to how these
people come to co-define the relationship and thereby the researcher. Being ethical means,
then, fundamentally being available, responsive and present to the other people in the
relationship, including being ready to engage with their concerns. In this sense, the researcher’s
position in relational ethics could be characterized with Levinas’ term of radical passivity
(Hofmeyr 2009; Roth 2010), one of being fundamentally open to the other. As Austin (2007)
notes, this does not, however, mean that “anything goes” in relational ethics. Rather, it
highlights the need to be sensitive and inclusive in our dialogue with the people we want to
study our being-in-the-world together with. Importantly, it also means that the dialogue is un-
finalizing, open to what the other people bring to it, and does not seek to determine define or
categorize them. This openness does not stop with the establishment of the research relation-
ship, but continues as the relationship evolves during the research and beyond (Ellis 2007).
By highlighting the need to being open to the concerns and actions of those we research, or
rather of those we do research together with, relational ethics calls the researcher to understand
herself as a participant in the everyday life of the researched rather than as a spectator of their
everyday life (Maffesoli 1989; Brinkmann 2012). Hence, relational ethics acknowledges the
related theoretical and ethical-political challenges that, among others, have long been pointed
out by both practice philosophy and feminist philosophy (Dewey 1920; Haraway 1991; Mol
2008): researchers are, after all, not only in the world, they are of the world (Barad 2007; also
Ingold 2013). This then further requires the researcher to take the social worlds of the people
who are part of the research, and their constitutive nature, seriously. Here relational research
ethics explicitly entails a political dimension—given that social relationships are laden with
power, situated in specific historical circumstances, and “weighted by social gravity” (Erickson
2006). This fundamental acknowledgement of the researcher’s contribution to the lives of the
researched implies conceiving of ethics beyond an exclusively protectionist agenda, beyond an
avoidance of harm exerted qua the authority of the researcher. Instead, the focus must be
directed toward how the researcher aims to work, together with the researched, on ameliorating
the living conditions of the researched—and possibly also the living conditions of the
researcher, namely working together towards a common good, or for one another’s well-being.
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But what is this common good, the virtues and/or values, that psychological researchers—
or following Anna Stetsenko (2008, 2015): transformative activists—strive towards? And how
can we work on promoting them via our research? Should we promote them at all? If we see
the ultimate goal of research being the production of new knowledge for the benefit of all
humanity, other beings in the world and nature, is this enough to ensure that the common good
is served? Given that what is good, when and for whom, is a contested terrain, is it possible for
us as researchers to avoid reinserting instrumentalist conceptualizations? Here, working with
relational ethics raises critical questions in particular about interventionist psychological
research, in which the outcome of a successful intervention is by and large predefined by
the researchers, and in which the research participants’ deviance from the scripted course of the
intervention design are usually considered unproductive breaches of fidelity (Engeström
2011). More generally, relational ethics raises critical questions to any participatory research
paradigm that works with a more relational notion of the researcher-researched and aims at
ameliorating living conditions from within and for practice. Bang and Vossoughi (2016), for
instance, proposed working with the following questions in order to unpack what this ethical
stance entails for participatory design research: “What forms of life are our partnerships and
designs reinforcing, powering, validating, and transforming? How do particular places, histo-
ries, and moments in time shape what is right or wrong and for whom?” (Bang and Vossoughi,
2016, p. 181). Are these deeply moral questions not also relevant to more relational concep-
tualizations of psychology and psychological knowledge in general?
Kickstarting the Debate: a Few Prototypical Propositions
The special section that this article introduces seeks to breathe new life into debates that deem
these deeply moral questions to be relevant for the production of psychological knowledge,
irrespective of the field from which this knowledge is produced. Related contributions engage
in theoretical and empirical discussions of research ethics and the moral dimension of psychol-
ogy, as their interest departs from the everyday practice lived together by researchers and
researched. They thus aim to develop theoretical concepts, as well as prototype guidelines and
methods, that are relevant for the everyday life practice of the people the research is conducted
with. Their research practice calls for the development of a relational research ethics which
cannot be separated from ethical considerations that more globally deal with how everyday life
can be lived together in good (or “virtuous”) ways, as an alternative to the usual utilitarian
guidelines and codes that “despite some good intentions, are oblique in addressing some of the
most important moral issues in psychology” (Teo 2015, p. 86). These ethical considerations are
related to fundamental ontological, epistemological and methodological debates, which discuss
psychology’s immanent relationality and subjectivity’s situatedness in everyday practice. Can,
on such grounds, psychology avoid considering itself a moral science (Brinkmann 2011;
Tolman 2003)? Does it need to work on intervention and/or emancipation to be or become
moral (Tolman 2008; Teo 2009)? And can it do so without becoming instrumental?
In their contribution, O’Doherty and Burgess (2019) illustrate the concrete relevance
of posing these grand questions in their discussion of the theoretical foundations implied
in current conceptions of informed consent and research participation. Their critique of
how current consent practices are unreflectively shaped by ideals of persons as rational
and autonomous decision-making agents calls for a more theoretically valid notion of
consent. This would need to take into account that decisions about research participation
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are always also situative, and that granting consent always affects a wider circle of people
than those explicitly asked. O’Doherty and Burgess therefore suggest to widen the range of
relations that researchers consider to be involved and affected when persons are asked to
grant consent. Furthermore, they stress that within relational ethics, there is the need for
heightened critical vigilance regarding who the research participants are in fact trusting and
to what extent. Marginalized and racialized populations (and perhaps everyone else, too)
have good reasons for doubting whether researchers truly have their well-being at heart,
and current ideals of informed choice do not adequately address these doubts. Relational
ethics, with its expanded notion of consent, can offer one possible prototype for produc-
tively addressing such shortcomings.
Rajala, Hilppö, Rainio, and Lipponen (forthcoming) explore what postcolonial theorizing
implies for research ethics in the context of globalizing education. From this perspective, they
discuss and critically scrutinize two prominent approaches for researching and promoting
empathy and compassion in education. The authors also outline a novel approach for
researching compassion in education that is responsive to postcolonial critique. This approach
is based on a transformative onto-epistemology (Stetsenko, 2016), which brings about new
ethical demands for researchers who seek not only to examine what is but also what is
possible.
Within relational ethics, the consideration of who and in what ways our research
efforts impact does not stop with just the research participants and their relations to the
researcher and others. What both Søndergaard (2019) and Chimirri (forthcoming) argue
for, is that any research effort that adopts a relational ethical standpoint needs to
consider not only of human actors. This ethical standpoint also needs to include the
significance of and impact on other-than-human life, thus extending across the existen-
tial and analytical apparatuses that human actors are unavoidably enmeshed in.
Søndergaard highlights the fact that when entering such apparatuses through our
research efforts, researchers ought actively to create spaces that allow for all parties
to intra-act, or in her words, co-think-feel with the whole of the apparatus. Such a
multi-visioned and multi-compassionate perspective would not only address possible
selectiveness (i.e., studying only a part of the apparatus) or asymmetry (i.e., caring only
for a part of the apparatus), but also function as a possible means for transforming the
apparatus itself from within. Chimirri (forthcoming) contribution seeks to epistemolog-
ically and ontologically ground Søndergaard’s and other posthumanistically inspired
perspectives on ethics, and to work out commonalities with dialectical-humanist under-
standings of research ethics. In his words, when engaging in research as a teleogenetic
collaboration, there is a need to acknowledge the determinate in-determinacy of the
collaborative effort, as well as the fundamental symmetry between all participants
regarding their diverse perspectives on the world. In other words, Chimirri points to
how none of the participants nor the researchers have a privileged perspective on the
phenomenon under study, and that the joint research effort should be treated as open-
ended, i.e., as having the possibility to lead to different ends than what might have been
initially imagined.
In a similar and yet very differently argued and deeply humanistically grounded
vein, Freeman (2019) discussion of Martin Buber’s and Emmanuel Levinas’ work, on
the notion of responsibility from a relational ethical perspective, delves more deeply
into the experiential relation between the researcher and the researched. Enveloped in
a personal and yet generally relevant narrative about the relationship between Freeman
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and his mother after she was diagnosed with dementia, Freeman compels us to think
about responsibility as fundamentally primordial, as pre-existing the relationship we
have with the people whose lives we want to understand. Highlighting how Levinas’
notion of “the face of the other” holds us hostage, Freeman offers a reflective space
for us to see and question to what extent our research efforts build on an instrumental
positioning of the people we study. Given his own example, Freeman proposes letting
the persons we study guide and direct the course of the investigation and in the data
generated during the course of this shapeshifting relationship. Importantly, Freeman
notes that this stance of being-led-by, rather than leading, others is a valuable ethical
ideal, but an ideal paradoxically at odds with the common notions of what it means to
do research.
The tension between who the research is fundamentally done for, for the immediate
others concretely involved in the research, or for the broader community in the imme-
diate or in the more distant future, for humanity altogether, or also for other-than-human
others, are foundational questions that all of this special section’s contributions address
but cannot unambiguously resolve. This underlines the fact that the utilitarian search for
a universalist ethical cookbook for the study of psychologically relevant phenomena such
as subjectivity may be in vain, and that more process-oriented, immanently relational and
situated alternatives must be developed for any field dealing with psychologically
relevant phenomena and questions.
Concluding Remarks
While the initial contributions to this special section all share the commitment of theorizing
research ethics and ethical decision-making as dependent on the concrete everyday circum-
stances of the researcher and the researched, and on how these play into the situated context of
their relational encounter and connectedness, it also becomes evident how the conceptual
minutiae of relational ethics deeply depend on the ontological, epistemological and method-
ological premises engrained in the respective theoretical tradition and perspective. To what
extent, for instance, non-human beings (are to) conceptually play into the researcher-
researched relationship, or to what extent human beings are considered as interdependent
individual beings, or instead as intradependently related collective becomings, and what this
implies for knowledge creation, plays fundamentally into how situated relational ethics can be
conceived of and put into psychological research practice. As these foundational conceptual
questions cannot (and arguably should never) be resolved in an unambiguous way, given the
complex and ever-developing character of everyday life and subjectivity, this introduction
wishes to conclude by inviting readers to contribute to this special section with further
perspectives and knowledge from psychology and other fields dealing with psychologically
relevant phenomena and questions, i.e., to join the discussion initiated by this special section in
order to further diversify our understandings of what it means to conduct ethically sound and
socially just research together with others. This research would seek to serve a common good
and avoid instrumentalizing all those others that our research and existence fundamentally
depend on, now and in the future.
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